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Os  panfletos  econômicos  surgidos  na  Inglaterra  durante  o  início  do  século  XVII  são 
freqüentemente  descritos  como  tentativas  de  influenciar  os rumos  da política  pública,  seja  com  o 
objetivo de proteger interesses estabelecidos, ou então em nome da sincera promoção de doutrinas 
mercantilistas. Entretanto, essa avaliação deixa de lado uma questão mais básica: em que medida os 
membros da comunidade mercantil inglesa eram capazes de influenciar a opinião pública e o processo 
de formulação de políticas? Consultas especiais acerca de questões econômicas prementes ofereciam 
uma oportunidade para que suas vozes fossem ouvidas, porém as crescentes dificuldades financeiras 
que  a  coroa  inglesa  enfrentava  à  época  abriram  a  principal  via  de  acesso  disponível  para  que 
participassem  ativamente  da  administração  pública.  Lionel  Cranfield  foi  certamente  o  mais  bem-
sucedido desses casos durante o período em questão, desempenhando um papel de destaque em meio 
aos debates públicos acerca da crise comercial do início da década de 1620 – debates sobre os quais a 
literatura econômica, em comparação, parece ter exercido impacto muito mais limitado. 
 





Economic pamphleteering in England during the early 17
th century has often been described as 
an attempt to influence the course of public policy with the aim of either protecting vested interests or 
else promoting in earnest the adoption of a few mercantilist doctrines. However, these judgments pass 
over a more basic question: to what extent, if any, could members of the English business community 
influence public opinion and the policy decision-making process? Special consultations over pressing 
economic  issues  offered  an  opportunity  for  their  voices  to  be  heard,  but  the  growing  financial 
difficulties which the English crown faced at that time opened the main path available for their active 
engagement with public administration. Lionel Cranfield was by far the most successful of such cases 
during the period at hand, playing a leading role throughout the public debates which surrounded the 
trade crisis of the early 1620’s – over which the pamphlet literature, in contrast, seems to have exerted 
a much more limited impact. 
 
Key words: pre-classical economics; mercantilism; 17
th century; Stuart England; Lionel Cranfield. 
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The early years of the 1620s witnessed the first debate over economic matters ever to appear 
in print in England: an acrimonious exchange between two businessmen separated by an important 
generational gap, Gerard de Malynes and Edward Misselden, and which also featured Thomas Mun as 
a somewhat remote interlocutor. The controversy had its roots in the pressing hardships the English 
economy went through at the time, confronted as it was with a commercial crisis which began in the 
Baltic area and from thence spread to England through its adverse effects on sales of woolen textiles, 
the kingdom’s main export article. Even the grave diplomatic and military events which took place in 
the Continent in connection with the swiftly developing Thirty Years’ War were not sufficient to keep 
public consciousness away from the depressed state of the economy. Decay of trade and scarcity of 
money turned, for a short while, into issues of truly general concern, of which the pamphlet literature 
is only the more apparent and long-lasting manifestation bequeathed by history. 
The  works published by Malynes,  Misselden, and  Mun  have attracted a lot  of scholarly 
interest, but  the  analysis  of their  intellectual achievements has too  easily  turned  to their  roles as 
developers  of  rudimentary  economic  concepts  or  advocates  for  vested  interests,  without  proper 
assessment  of a  more  basic  question:  how,  if at  all, could  these  writers hope  to influence  public 
opinion, and thus the course of public policy? Jacob Viner famously wrote abut the 1620’s debates: 
“Perhaps for the first time, a matter of economic policy was made the occasion for a war of tracts. 
Perhaps for the last time, the tracts seem to have exerted an immediate and traceable influence on 
government policy” (1930, p. 254); but his analysis of this supposed dual movement does not go any 
further. Other historians have duly noted the role played by the three pamphleteers in the investigative 
committees set  up  by  the  English  government  in  order  to  evaluate  and  propose  solutions  for the 
depression,  chief  among  them  J.D.  Gould  (1954;  1955)  and  Barry  Supple  (1964).  The  latter  in 
particular has  examined in some  detail the structure of the  official  committees  created  during the 
1621-23 period, but his focus was on their institutional significance and their role in shaping economic 
policy – not on the interaction between the business and courtly worlds. More recently, building upon 
Supple’s original findings, Lars Magnusson has once again pointed to the influence exerted by the 
debates held in these committees over the ideas of Mun and his fellow pamphleteers, but also without 
exploring at length the paths open for these individuals to participate in the political arena (1994, pp. 
65-7, 80-7). 
Along the following pages, I will try to fill some of these historiographical gaps, first by 
exposing  some  of  the  economic,  political,  and  institutional  features  which  permeated  Jacobean 
England,  and  then  by  showing  how  representatives  of  the  kingdom’s  business  elite  –  economic 
experts, if we will – could participate in public deliberations, and how they did participate during the 
early 1620’s procedures. 
 
* * * 
 
In an important article about the state of England’s foreign trade during the late 16
th century, 
Lawrence Stone stated: “The famous expansion of trade in the reign of Elizabeth appears to be a pious 
myth” (1949, p. 50). Indeed, the Elizabethan period – in stark contrast with the conditions which had 
prevailed earlier in the century – was characterized by the persistence of a recessive scenario, due in 
particular to the secular exhaustion of an expansionary cycle across the Western European economy, The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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and the consequent saturation of the markets for England’s textile exports (Brenner, 2003, pp. 33-40; 
Fisher, 1940, pp. 104-5). Important structural transformations did occur at that time. The increase in 
foreign competition led to rising nationalism and a consequent growth in the share of the kingdom’s 
trade  controlled  by  English  merchants.  Especially  after  the  dismantling  of  the  Antwerp  market, 
England  was  forced  to  establish  more  direct  relations  with  its  trading  partners,  inducing  an 
institutional reorganization  which  concentrated  foreign trade in the hands of  merchant companies. 
Also, the production of lighter, cheaper textile products collectively known as new draperies began to 
develop  at  the  expense  of  the  traditional  broadcloths,  with  the  aim  of  supplying  Mediterranean 
markets. The beneficial effects of such transformations, however, would only be felt in the long run; 
throughout the late 16
th century, England was plagued by chronic economic stagnation. 
The situation was drastically improved after the accession of James I, in 1604. The cessation 
of hostilities with Spain made it possible for England to enjoy, for a short while, the benefits that 
normally accrue to business from a position of neutrality in times of general warfare. Foreign trade 
and domestic industrial activity entered a phase of vigorous development, occupying the empty spaces 
left in maritime trade by the United Provinces’ military effort, and upheld by the growth in both the 
production  of  new  draperies and the re-export trade with Levantine  and East Indian  commodities 
(Fisher, 1950, pp. 153-5; Nef, 1953, p. 297; Supple, 1964, pp. 28-9; Wilson, 1965, p. 52). The first 
decade of Stuart rule proved to be a period of unmistakable prosperity, unleashing a whole array of 
economic forces which had been repressed and sterilized for decades. 
Indeed, the first of the economic disasters which abated over England during the decades that 
preceded the Civil Wars was a direct consequence of this newly acquired sense of confidence and 
optimism about the state of the kingdom’s trade. In 1614, exports of broadcloths reached a record 
level, prompting the reappearance of an idea which had been recurrent ever since woolen textiles had 
replaced raw wool as the kingdom’s main export article, by the late 15
th century. English broadcloths 
were mostly exported in an unfinished state, to be dyed and dressed in manufacturing centers located 
in the Low Countries and from there sent to their final markets. Such an international division of labor 
naturally  raised  much  hostility  with  the  English  public  opinion,  which  felt  that  the  kingdom’s 
traditional products should be brought to perfection by the hands of the kingdom’s own subjects. Held 
under control during the Elizabethan period due to the fragile state of international trade, the pressure 
for political intervention in the cloth market finally found fertile ground in the auspicious early years 
of James I’s reign. 
The policy experiment which came to be known as the Cockayne project was the product of 
a coalition of interest groups which aimed to curtail and absorb some of the privileges enjoyed by the 
Merchant Adventurers company, but whose professed aim was to entirely replace the exportation of 
unfinished broadcloths with that of properly finished pieces (Friis, 1927, pp. 224-40; Hinton, 1959, pp. 
7-11; Supple, 1964, pp. 36-7). The project was enthusiastically supported by the king himself, who 
was eager to write his name in the history of the English cloth industry, just as Henry VII had done. 
Officially sanctioned in July 1614, its ill-conceived nature soon became apparent in the catastrophic 
results brought about. With the truce in 1609, the United Provinces’ competitive position in European 
trade had been once again much strengthened; England’s beliefs in the uniqueness and irreplaceability 
of its own  woolen production, on the  other hand, were  well  off the  mark. Boycotted in the Low The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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Countries and unable to penetrate effectively in other markets, English textile exports were cut in half 
already in the first quarter of 1615. The project was still continued for some time due to the king’s 
unshakeable confidence, but the damages done to the textile sector eventually became unsustainable, 
leading to its revocation early in 1617 (Friis, 1927, pp. 273-362). Although former conditions were 
partially restored, the episode brought the onset of a secular decline in the traditional broadcloth trade, 
which would never reach the peaks of 1614 again (Supple, 1964, pp. 33, 46; Unwin, 1966a, p. 286; 
Wilson, 1969, p. 105). 
The English economy had hardly recovered from the disruptions caused by the Cockayne 
project  when another  crisis struck, this time  coming from abroad. The initial stages  of the Thirty 
Years’  War,  which  suddenly  required  massive  financial  commitments  from  a  myriad  of  fragile 
political  units  across  the  Imperial  dominions,  gave  rise  to  a  vertiginous  process  of  monetary 
debasements known as the Kipper- und Wipperzeit, which had been held in check only precariously 
during the previous decades (Fisher, 1950, p. 155; Kindleberger, 1991, pp. 151-4; Shaw, 1895, pp. 
202-7). Although England was largely unaffected by the circulation of debased currency, its export 
activities were severely injured as a result  of the artificial realignment in the terms  of trade  with 
Continental commercial partners – inflationary lags within areas of debased currency, when coupled 
with instantaneous adjustments in exchange rates, meant that local products became relatively cheaper 
than their imported counterparts.  At the time, the most important markets for English textiles were 
still  the  Baltic  area  and  the  Western  German  territories,  both  heavily  affected  by  currency 
manipulations. Accordingly, from 1620 to 1624, the kingdom’s cloth exports were drastically reduced, 
and the manufacturing districts were suddenly faced with acute poverty, unemployment and economic 
depression  –  a  bleak  scenery  all  too  often  reflected  in  vivid  testimonies  and  genuine  public 
consternation (Hinton, 1955, pp. 13-33; Supple, 1964, pp. 53-8, 73-6). 
The early 1620’s were thus a period of general economic distress for England, and it was 
only natural that this would become a topic of interest for English society at large. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that the uncommon intensity which characterized the public debates held at that time over 
economic issues was a direct consequence of two factors. Firstly, it had to do with the close succession 
of two critical events: a disastrous policy experiment which disrupted a fundamental trade and thus 
generated  much  popular  discontent,  and  a powerful  commercial  crisis  which  hit  upon  an  already 
weakened industrial and commercial structure. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the depressed 
state of the kingdom stood in dramatic contrast with the prosperous conditions which had prevailed 
less  than  a  decade  earlier,  and  which  were  thus  still  very  much  alive  in  everyone’s  memory. 
Recessions and depressions had been a constant feature of the whole Elizabethan period, and although 
much reasoning and pondering over economic topics emerged as a result, these episodes never turned 
into an occasion for general public assessment. By the early 1620’s, however, economic stagnation 
had become unacceptable. 
 
* * * 
 
The English crown had always, in one way or another, concerned itself with the kingdom’s 
economic activity. Besides the obvious relevance of agriculture and manufacture for the well-ordering 
of daily life, customs duties had been, since the Middle Ages, one of the few sources of public finance The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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which were flexible in the short run, and therefore its proper management was a matter worthy of 
much  diligence. Throughout the Early  Modern Period,  however,  as the state grew in its size  and 
functions, and the price revolution slowly  eroded traditional  crown revenues, fiscal administration 
turned into a formidable challenge facing every English monarch. Maintaining public solvency was a 
task which increasingly required tapping resources generated within the kingdom’s flourishing trade. 
As the English business class matured during the course of the 16
th century, the crown started working 
closely – although not always harmoniously – with the City of London in order to assure its own 
financial health. Public finance thus became the main path open for ordinary businessmen to break 
into the court’s restrictive high circles. 
Since the financial reforms introduced by the Marquess of Winchester during the reigns of 
Edward VI and Mary I, the Exchequer administration was removed from the monarch’s direct control 
and put under the care of the kingdom’s Lord Treasurer, who became one of the most prestigious and 
influential  of the  crown’s  high  officials (Dietz, 1931, pp. 3-7). As such, the position  was  always 
occupied by very prominent court figures. For the best part of her reign, Elizabeth relied on Lord 
Burghley for the task of managing her coffers, and the Lord Treasurer accordingly enjoyed with her 
the admiration of future generations for the much praised policy of frugality and providence. Fiscal 
solvency, however, required more than simply curtailing court extravagance and other ostentatious 
expenditures. During the Elizabethan era, it involved, among other things, negotiating loans in the 
Low Countries and using the Merchant Adventurers both as a source of credit and as a means of 
manipulating the exchange market at Antwerp (Unwin, 1966b, pp. 133, 146-52, 165-7). The ablest of 
courtiers was still, quite naturally, ill-suited for tasks of this nature, forcing the crown to rely on the 
expertise of a different class of subjects. 
Under the late Tudors, the dirty work was done by Sir Thomas Gresham, who acted as the 
sovereign’s  financial  agent  at  Antwerp.  The  value  of  Gresham’s  services  lay  in  his  extensive 
knowledge about the workings of exchange markets, a field dominated by specialists and obscure to 
most laymen, which eluded and often embarrassed the crown in its ineptness. After his death in 1579, 
Gresham was replaced by Sir Horatio Palavicino,  who played a  fundamental role in the  financial 
maneuvering which the onset of war against Spain required. But with the collapse of Antwerp, the 
Low Countries gradually began to be replaced by the burgeoning City of London as the main suppliers 
of royal credit (Dietz, 1931, p. 27; Ashton, 1960, pp. 1-30). In order to complement the resources 
obtained through the long-established Privy Seal demand notes, the crown started working closely 
with the Corporation of London, who either directly raised loans with its citizens or else acted as 
guarantor of royal debt. Along the first decades of the 17
th century, as the crown’s budget deteriorated, 
the bonds between the City and Whitehall were continuously strengthened. 
James I’ first Lord Treasurer, the Earl of Dorset, was a heritage from Elizabeth, and it was 
under his tenure that the great farm of the customs was finally established, consolidating the rights to 
collect almost all of the kingdom’s customs duties into a single concession (Dietz, 1931, pp. 118-21, 
305-37; Newton, 1918, passim). The dispute for this license gave rise to powerful business syndicates 
which gathered many of the City’s financial magnates; accordingly, throughout the reigns of James I 
and Charles I, the great farm’s incumbents also became one of the most important sources of public 
credit, anticipating the crown’s future revenues (Ashton, 1960, pp. 87-105). The new patterns of court The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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expenditure introduced by the Stuarts, however, soon translated into chronic and escalating budget 
deficits, turning public finance into a virtually intractable problem which constantly tormented English 
sovereigns. The Earl of Salisbury – who succeeded Dorset as Lord Treasurer after the latter’s death in 
1608, and who was undoubtedly the most powerful public official of James’ early reign – tried to 
reach a permanent solution for the fiscal dilemma through the Great Contract, an agreement where 
parliament  were  to  approve  the  collection  of  a  fixed  annual  subsidy  in  exchange  for  the  king 
definitively abdicating some of his feudal rights (Dietz, 1931, pp. 126, 133-43; Wilson, 1965, pp. 91-
2).  The  contract  negotiations  ultimately  failed,  and  with  them  the  possibility  of  a  financial 
consolidation via the parliamentary route. From then on, the task of keeping the crown solvent would 
become a matter of daily concern. 
After  Salisbury’s  death  in  1612,  a  vacuum  of  power  was  created  which  saw  James 
attempting to bring control over public affairs closer to his own hands. It was in this context that the 
doors were open at court to a man who would later play a fundamental role during the proceedings that 
surrounded the early 1620’s commercial crisis. Lionel Cranfield was a City merchant who had dealt 
mainly in textile exports before getting involved with customs farming during the 1600’s. When the 
contract for the great farm was due, his first-hand knowledge of the farmer’s practices led to him being 
called to help the Treasury Commission in the negotiations for a new concession. Incurring the wrath 
of his former business associates, Cranfield revealed their fraudulent record-keeping techniques and 
allowed the crown to obtain far more advantageous terms for itself in the new lease (Prestwich, 1966, 
pp. 107-32). As a reward, he was knighted and nominated Surveyor-General of the Customs. In 1615, 
Cranfield  and  John  Wolstenholme,  another  customs  officer,  compiled  an  estimate  of  England’s 
balance of trade with the aim of demonstrating the adverse effects produced by changing conditions in 
the international  cloth  markets. Around this time, Cranfield also started developing a plan for tax 
reform  which  involved  the  establishment  of  an  openly  protectionist  and  discriminatory  customs 
structure – a project which was very well received at court, but never put in practice due to the absence 
of parliamentary meetings during that period (Prestwich, 1966, pp. 158-98; Tawney, 1958, pp. 128-
134). 
With the rise of the future Duke of Buckingham by the middle of the decade, Cranfield 
immediately changed his political allegiances and came under the new favorite’s patronage. From then 
on, his ascension was swift
1. James’ expedition to Scotland in 1617 put an alarming strain on the 
crown’s  budget,  and  Buckingham  thus  came  to  power  knowing  that  the  stability  of  his  position 
depended  crucially  on  a  successful  financial  reform.  Given  his  business  origins, Cranfield  was  a 
natural candidate for pursuing an agenda of austerity in public expenditure. From 1618 to 1620, he 
tackled one after another the most important royal departments, working under the close supervision 
of Buckingham’s right-hand man, Lord Chancellor Sir Francis Bacon (Ashton, 1957, p. 20; Cramsie, 
2002,  pp.  159-69;  Prestwich,  1966,  pp.  199-211).  The  results  achieved  were  impressive  by  any 
account, earning Cranfield the confidence of the king himself. In 1619, he obtained the prestigious 
(and lucrative) position of Master of the Court of Wards, and also joined a host of notabilities in the 
Treasury Commission. Two years later, with the fall of Bacon, the path was open for Cranfield, who 
had often been derogatorily described as a “London apprentice” at court, to subvert the tradition of 
                                                
1 The story of Cranfield’s spectacular rise and fall is at once so telling and unusual that it has been told not only once, but 
twice – first by R.H. Tawney (1958), and later, in greater detail, by Menna Prestwich (1966). The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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English  public  administration  in  spectacular  fashion:  in  September  1621,  he  was  appointed  Lord 
Treasurer, entering the peerage one year later as 1
st Earl of Middlesex (Prestwich, 1966, pp. 286-329; 
Tawney, 1958, pp. 193-4). 
The challenges imposed by the crown’s financial difficulties thus offered the main entrance 
into public administration available for representatives of the business world. However, their expert 
advice was also sought on other, more specific occasions. In 1576, a royal commission on exchange 
and other currency matters was established, having Gresham as one of its members; towards the end of 
Elizabeth’s reign, the theme was once again taken up, and a commission which included Gerard de 
Malynes was charged with establishing the true par of exchange (Gauci, 2004a, p. 380). Situations 
such as these normally put men of business and public officers working side by side. On the 1576 
commission, Gresham was joined by Burghley, Walsingham and Sir Thomas Smith, among others 
(Dewar, 1965, p. 480). The proceedings which surrounded the Cockayne project had Sir Edward Coke 
– who was by then already recognized as England’s most prominent jurist – cooperating with the 
merchants who promoted the scheme (Friis, 1927, pp. 223, 240-9; White, 1979, pp. 284-90). Bacon 
and  Cranfield  themselves  formed  a  rather  unique  partnership,  and  the  Privy  Council  records 
throughout James I’s reign bear ample testimony to the crown’s willingness to count on specialist 
opinion when necessary – merchants, clothiers, customs farmers, and financiers were all frequently 
called before the lords of the Council to state their perspective on issues which affected the kingdom’s 
economic health. The extreme adversities brought about by the early 1620’s commercial crisis offered 
much room for these and other voices to express themselves. 
 
* * * 
 
Ever since the first accounts of a stoppage in the cloth trade started arriving at the Council 
table early in 1620, the crown endeavored to look further into the matter. Around May of that year, a 
committee  was  created  with the aim  of investigating the complaints brought forward by Eastland 
merchants and some clothing districts, having Cranfield as one of its members. In order to accomplish 
its task, the committee heard the testimonies of representatives sent by the Merchant Adventurers and 
other clothing districts, who all but confirmed the graveness of the situation. In light of the alarming 
reports, the committee was transformed into a permanent body charged with monitoring conditions in 
the cloth trade, a group that included, besides Cranfield, Bacon, and Coke, other distinguished officers 
of  Buckingham’s  administration such  as  Secretaries  of  State  Sir Robert  Naunton  and  Sir  George 
Calvert and Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Fulke Greville (Friis, 1927, pp. 384-6). 
But although the crown was aware of the problems, the full extent of the crisis would only 
become  apparent  the  following  year,  with  the  advent  of  a  parliamentary  meeting.  At  first  only 
acquainted  with  the  conditions  that  prevailed  within  their  own  areas,  the  representatives  of  the 
kingdom met in Westminster early in 1621 and realized that their miseries were shared by most others. 
Moreover, this was to be the first parliamentary session in almost seven years, which meant that all the 
economic grievances which had been piling up since the Cockayne fiasco had not yet fallen under the 
scrutiny of the House of Commons. Encouraged by the crown, the parliament thus set about debating 
and investigating the possible means of restoring the kingdom to a state of prosperity (Friis, 1927, p. 
395; Hinton, 1955, p. 13; Tawney, 1958, pp. 184-7). The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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Although  the  crown  often  considered  the  viewpoints  espoused  by  the  different  parties 
involved in any given issue, the House of Commons obviously offered an arena where interest groups 
could present their perspectives and push their agendas more at will. Merchants, clothiers, farmers, 
and provincial ports all struggled, accordingly, to have their own benefit contemplated, preventing the 
emergence of a coherent line of action. But concern with the crisis was large enough to induce the 
creation of two parliamentary committees aimed at investigating the kingdom’s economic maladies, 
one of them charged with the decay in the cloth trade and the other with the perceived scarcity of 
money
2. Cranfield, who sit in the Commons as an MP for Arundel, was named chair of the latter, 
whereas the former was put under the care of Sir Edwin Sandys, a leading member of the Virginia 
Company. As parliament struggled to reconcile trade and money as a dual manifestation of the same 
underlying problem, the economic debates soon turned into a confrontation between Cranfield, who 
acted on behalf of the crown, and Sandys, who styled himself as a spokesman for the provincial ports 
while protecting his own company’s stakes in the tobacco trade
3. Gathering support from Sir Edward 
Coke, who was by far the most prominent figure in the Commons throughout the session
4, and also 
benefiting from Cranfield’s controversial public image, Sandys quickly stepped ahead and became 
parliament’s leader in economic affairs (Prestwich, 1966, pp. 286-329). 
But although he failed to guide economic debates in the Commons, Cranfield’s prestige at 
court was higher than ever. He was appointed Lord Treasurer during the summer adjournment, and 
given that parliament was incapable of reaching positive policy conclusions, the Privy Council, under 
his  leadership,  set  about  implementing  measures  aimed  at  redressing  the  kingdom’s  economic 
difficulties. Several of these measures reflected the debates carried out in the Commons during the 
preceding months, a demonstration both of the crown’s willingness to preserve good relations with 
parliament and of its respect for the opinions held by those directly involved in economic activity. But 
Cranfield  had  a  much  broader  understanding  of  the  crisis  than  the  petty  disputes  embodied  in 
parliamentary  prescriptions.  An  obstinate  adherent  of  the  balance  of  trade  as  an  instrument  for 
evaluating  the  state  of  the  kingdom’s  economy
5, he  soon  established  new  public  commissions  to 
investigate  further  into  the  causes  of  the  depression  –  this  time  under  his  own  leadership  and 
supervision. 
Thomas Mun’s first published pamphlet – A Discourse of Trade, from England unto the East 
Indies – appeared in 1621 as an explicit attempt to influence parliamentary proceedings. At the time, 
Mun occupied a very solid position within London’s merchant community as a member of the East 
India Company’s court of directors (Gauci, 2004b, 230-1). The company had come under heavy fire 
                                                
2 Commons Debates, 1621, vol. II, pp. 30-1, 76-8; vol. III, pp. 3-4; vol. V, pp. 3-4, 439-40, 456-8. 
3 Commons Debates, 1621, vol. II, p. 139; vol. IV, pp. 112-3; vol. V, p. 516; vol. VI, p. 16. 
4 After falling out of favor in 1616, Coke had found his way back into court towards the end of the decade through his 
relations with Buckingham. His position, though, was now much more fragile, in particular because Bacon, a lifetime 
enemy, had become the central figure of the Stuart administration. Coke joined the Commons in 1621 with the clear 
purpose of bringing Bacon down and substituting him as Lord Chancellor. He succeeded in the first task, but failed in the 
second, a fact which finally put an end to all his hopes of ever achieving a prominent position at court again. From that 
moment, Coke assumed an openly confrontational attitude towards the crown and became the main leader of parliamentary 
opposition to the Stuart regime (Prestwich, 1966, pp. 286-98; White, 1979, passim). 
5  Besides his pioneer efforts to estimate England’s balance of trade during the late 1610’s, Cranfield’s deep concern with this 
analytical instrument became apparent in several occasions during his interventions in the House of Commons, where he 
could frequently be heard stating that “by increase of Trade outward, the Kingdom thrives; but by Excess of Importacion it 
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from some quarters in the Commons on account of its silver exports, and Mun thus used his literary 
skills to exempt his merchant group from blame. One of the pamphlet’s main arguments was that, 
although the East India Company did export silver to pay for the commodities it imported, this loss of 
bullion was more than compensated with the trade surpluses obtained in the re-export trade to other 
European  nation;  a  proper  evaluation  of  the  company’s  activities,  therefore,  had  to  take  into 
consideration the net result of its trade as a whole, which was, according to Mun, highly beneficial for 
England (1621, pp. 13-21). 
Already  by  the  end  of  1621,  while  parliament  was  still  convened,  the  Privy  Council 
established a committee for investigating the decayed state of the cloth trade, gathering several of the 
MPs who had actively contributed to the economic debates during the previous months
6 – although Sir 
Edwin Sandys, significantly enough, was left out. Among those who joined the committee there were 
a few distinguished members of the East India Company, such as Sir Dudley Digges and Sir Morris 
Abbott. Also included  were the  names  of Sir John  Wolstenholme and Sir  Arthur Ingram, two of 
Cranfield’s closest associates, reinforcing the Lord Treasurer’s deep involvement with the committee’s 
proceedings. Parliament was finally dissolved in the first weeks of 1622, leaving the Privy Council 
once again entirely in charge of dealing with the crisis; as the initial committee failed to produce a 
general assessment, new actions were taken. In April, a new committee was created with the purpose 
of hearing reports by the merchant companies and the textile districts, and subsequently evaluating 
what were the reasons behind the trade depression. This new, smaller committee was composed of a 
few crown officers and some representatives of London’s business elite – among them, Thomas Mun
7. 
Around the same time, the Council also approached a group of perceived experts soliciting a 
report  on  the  current  state  of  international  exchange  markets.  The  individuals  involved  in  the 
preparation  of  this  report  were  Sir  Robert Cotton,  Sir  Ralph  Maddison,  William  Sanderson,  John 
Williams and Gerard de Malynes, all men of a very different breed from those sitting in the new trade 
committee. Indeed, with the exception of Maddison, this was essentially a group of elders. Malynes 
had worked as a merchant in London since the 1580’s, serving the crown in numerous occasions 
during Elizabeth’s later decades (Gauci, 2004a, passim). Sanderson, too, was a typical Elizabethan 
businessman,  a  Merchant  Adventurer  who  financed  voyages  of  discovery,  including  Raleigh’s 
Virginia expedition
8 (McIntyre, 1956, pp. 184-8). But it is Sir Robert Cotton who provides the key to 
understand  the  constitution  of  this  peculiar  clique.  A  prominent  courtier  throughout  the  late 
Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, Cotton was a close relative of the Montagu clan, who had Henry, 
Viscount Mandeville as one of its members. Mandeville, who was at that time one of the longest-
standing public officers of England, had preceded Cranfield as Lord Treasurer and currently served as 
Lord President of the Privy Council (Sharpe, 1979, pp. 12-4, 113-93). 
Cotton’s group worked fast and delivered a report to the Council already in the first days of 
May
9. Their appraisal stressed that recent alterations in the standards of Continental currencies had not 
                                                
6 Acts of the Privy Council, vol. 6, pp. 79-80. 
7 Acts of the Privy Council, vol. 6, pp. 201-3. 
8 There are evidences that Sanderson and Malynes had been closely associated since the Elizabethan period. Ruth McIntyre, 
for instance, found documents written by Sanderson’s son where Malynes is described as his father’s assistant (1956, pp. 
187-8). 
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been adequately transmitted to exchange rates, which caused English currency – whose standard had 
remained the same – to become undervalued against its foreign counterparts in exchange markets. 
Also according to them, this essentially monetary imbalance lay at the root of the kingdom’s trade 
disorders, for the unfavorable exchange made unprofitable the remittance of silver into England and 
put a premium on its exportation, thus adversely affecting commodity flows – a conclusion which ran 
counter to Cranfield’s emphasis on the balance of trade as an explanation for the crisis. The report was 
immediately submitted to the consideration of a second group of experts, which exclusively featured 
eminent merchants, and was led by none other than Thomas Mun
10. 
The  obvious  fact  that  this  was  a  confrontation  between  two  opposing  parties  was  only 
reinforced by the judgment passed by Mun and his fellows. Their conclusions were the exact opposite 
of those offered by the original exchange report on almost every aspect: exchange rates did not reflect 
the intrinsic equivalence between currencies, and attempts to control exchange operations would be 
either impossible or ineffective; the balance of trade was the “principall and p[re]dominant cause of 
the plenty and scarcity of monyes in all Com[m]on wealthes”, a rule which was “necessarilie and 
univ[er]sallie true”
11.  Although  it  is  difficult to  prove beyond  doubt  that  Mun  had,  at  this point, 
become a spokesman for Cranfield amidst the investigative committees, some telling evidence seems 
to point in that direction. Cranfield and Mun had actually known each other prior to the former’s 
entrance at court – in 1610, the future Lord Treasurer borrowed money from his merchant colleague in 
order to finance a speculative land deal (Tawney, 1958, pp. 111-2). Mun was a distinguished member 
of the East India Company, a rising merchant group which was held in high esteem at court, but he 
had never been an MP or served the crown in any other manner; then after publishing a pamphlet 
which explored at some length the topic of imbalances in international trade, he was suddenly included 
both in the new trade committee of April 1622 and in the group charged with appraising the exchange 
report,  to  the  detriment  of  all  his  fellow  East  India  merchants  who  had  participated  in  the 
parliamentary debates and in the original trade committee. Moreover, the reasoning displayed when 
evaluating the exchange report marked a significant rhetorical departure: whereas on the Discourse 
Mun had duly recognized “the abuse of the exchanges betwixt us and other Countries” as one of the 
reasons for the scarcity of money (1621, p. 51), he would now describe the impact of the balance of 
trade over monetary flows as “a necessitie of nature beyond all resistance”.
12 
In June, the trade committee presented his final report to the Privy Council, stating that, after 
hearing  representatives  sent  by  merchant  companies,  clothiers,  provincial  landowners,  customs 
officers, and London textile  workers, they had been able to  establish the main  factors behind the 
depression (Thirsk & Cooper, 1972, pp. 210-6). The report recognized the validity of the reasons put 
forward by both of the groups which had evaluated the state of the exchange, but dedicated much more 
emphasis to Mun’s balance of trade arguments. In conclusion, it recommended the establishment of a 
permanent commission charged with investigating these and other related issues – advice which was 
followed the next October with the creation of the Standing Commission on Trade
13. Mun was once 
                                                
10 British Library, Additional Manuscripts 34.324, f. 154. 
11 British Library, Additional Manuscripts 34.324, f. 156. 
12 British Library, Additional Manuscripts 34.324, ff. 156-7. 
13 England and Wales. Sovereign (1603-1625, James I). Iames by the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France, and 
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again included in its ranks, as were all other members of the second trade committee; Wolstenholme 
and Digges – Mun’s fellow East India merchant and economic pamphleteer
14 – also had seats within 
the commission, alongside several high officers such as Calvert and Greville. But although Malynes 
was not remembered, both Maddison and Mandeville were, guaranteeing that the debates which had 
been carried out in the preceding months would be continued in this new public arena. 
Also around June 1622, Edward Misselden published his first pamphlet, Free Trade, or the 
meanes to make trade flourisheth, where he openly criticized Malynes’ project of controlling exchange 
operations according to the intrinsic parity between currencies, even quoting excerpts from Malynes’ 
A treatise of the canker of England’s common wealth, published in 1601 (Misselden, 1622, p. 104). A 
young member of the Merchant Adventurers, Misselden was fully aware of the work done by the trade 
committee, which he described as the “choicest wits of the Kingdome”, but his own analysis was an 
eclectic mix of monetary and balance of trade arguments, much in the same vein as that found in 
Mun’s Discourse – as  an alternative to  Malynes’ par of  exchange, he  did not suggest the proper 
balancing of foreign trade, but rather an enhancement of English silver currency (1622, pp. 106-7). By 
the end of that year, Malynes responded with The maintenance of free trade, where he reinforced his 
ideas about the preponderant effect exerted by exchange imbalances over international money and 
commodity flows. In order to establish his own expertise in the area, the author duly mentioned the 
exchange investigations referred “to the learned, Lord Viscount Mandeville […] and other persons of 
knowledge and experience” (1622a, p. v); later on, he played with the age differential which separated 
him from his opponent, terming him, in a slightly derogatory manner, as the “Moderne Merchant of 
Hackney” (1622a, p. 9). 
Simultaneously, Malynes was also arguing his case before the recently established Standing 
Commission.  In  December,  he  and  his  associates  submitted  two  documents  for  the  commission’s 
appreciation, one of them entitled “Reasons to prove the abuse of the Exchange of monyes by Bills to 
be the efficient cause of the overballanceinge of forraine Comodities in Price”
15. The resemblance 
between the main line of reasoning developed in these memoranda and in the published pamphlet is 
striking, although the argument is here developed in a much sharper and more concise manner. The 
debate was further pursued and intensified in both fronts throughout 1623. The Standing Commission 
was presented with numerous documents individually penned by Malynes, Maddison, and Mun, who 
left aside their former practice of collective writing in order to openly confront each other
16. In print, 
Misselden counter-attacked with The Circle of Commerce, or the Balance of Trade, which marked a 
significant departure from his former pamphlet. 
For one thing, Misselden’s rhetoric was now much more aggressive. He alternately accused 
Malynes of being an agent for the Dutch, insinuated he had never actually been a merchant, ridiculed 
his knowledge of ancient languages and consequently his interpretation of the classic authors, and 
denounced  him  as  a  plagiarist  of  other  people’s  ideas  –  characterizing  his  opponent,  in  sum,  as 
someone who deserved “contempt rather than the honour of an answer” (1623, p. 4). But a more 
                                                
14 Sir Dudley Digges had published a pamphlet in 1615 entitled The Defence of Trade, which also sought to excuse the East 
India Company from public criticism of its activities. 
15 British Library, Additional Manuscripts 34.324, ff. 163-6. 
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important change had occurred in the thrust of  his  main arguments. As the pamphlet’s title itself 
suggested, Misselden was now an unrepentant believer in the primacy of the balance of trade over 
every other  explanation put forward  for the  crisis – the text is actually often credited as the first 
appearance in print of the exact term “balance of trade”. It is not entirely clear what brought about this 
sudden change in emphasis, but it seems more than likely that the connections Misselden had recently 
established with the East India Company – which he served in 1623 as a commissioner in the United 
Provinces – played a major role in it. In The Circle of Commerce, Misselden described Mun as a man 
“with such endowments, as are rather to bee wisht in all, then easie to bee found in many Merchants of 
these times” (1623, p. 36); even more significantly, he indulged in a lengthy and elaborate praise of 
Cranfield, to whom the pamphlet was dedicated, recalling the Lord Treasurer’s efforts to disseminate 
the balance of trade within public administration: 
 
For although the Ballance of Trade, is an ancient Piece, which in elder times, hath beene in 
great use in this Kingdome, as I shall shew in this Circle, in it’s own Angle: yet it was 
almost worne out and defac’t, but renew’d and refresh’t by none, but by Your Lordship 
onely. When the Eye of Heaven, in the Eye of the King, had look’t upon You, and pickt You 
out, and plac’t You in a higher Orb; You were first seene in this Circle, of the Ballance of 
Trade: other faire Pieces You had, but this was Your Master Piece, because all the rest had 
reference unto this (Misselden, 1623, pp. iv-v). 
 
* * * 
 
The exchange between Misselden and Malynes came to an end with the publication of the 
latter’s The Center of the Circle of Commerce, by the end of 1623. Malynes clearly perceived the 
sudden in change in Misselden’s attitude, and insinuated that he was merely acting as a mouthpiece for 
Mun – which would explain why he had never appeared before his Majesty’s Commissioners, “who 
have  often  called  him  by  Warrants  and  otherwise”  (1623,  p.  123).  The  confrontations  between 
Malynes and Mun within the arena offered by the Standing Commission’s investigation had escalated 
throughout that year, reaching ever more uncompromising tones. But as economic conditions started 
to improve in 1624, the debate gradually waned without clear winners. Mun’s final reflections about 
the episode, embodying a consummate defense of the balance of trade as the ultimate determinant of 
international monetary flows, would only appear much later, in 1664, when his son finally brought 
England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade to print. 
Although there was room, in Early Stuart England, for business experts to actively influence 
the course of public policy, the available channels were certainly narrow and oftentimes exclusive. A 
solid foothold at court was crucial, but very few were able to penetrate a world still largely impervious 
to the allure of raw material wealth. The Jacobean era had in Lionel Cranfield, the London apprentice 
who became Lord Treasurer, a strikingly unusual case, and contemporaries who shared his business 
background  duly  recognized  the  great  opportunity  offered  by  having  one  of their  own  in  such  a 
prominent position. Through his association with Cranfield, Mun was able to play an important role in 
the public investigations about the trade crisis, and Misselden quickly tried to follow in his footsteps. 
As the businessman of a past generation, Malynes could count on Mandeville for support at court, but The Role of Experts in the Public Assessment of England’s Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’S - CEDEPLAR/UFMG - TD 421 (2011) 
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he was well aware that his prestigious yet elderly patron could not match the influence commanded by 
Cranfield as a leading member of Buckingham’s faction. Accordingly, he tried to obtain the Lord 
Treasurer’s favor, asking for permission to dedicate to his memory a massive merchant compendium 
he  had been  writing  for decades
17. But Cranfield obviously had  no use for someone  who  did not 
acknowledge the all-important nature of the balance of trade. When Lex Mercatoria came out, it was 
dedicated to the king, and Malynes had to go back to writing pamphlets and refuting Misselden’s 
calumnies.  
From all the above-said, it seems reasonably clear that printed literature was, at that time, not 
more than a second-best choice for those who wished to influence public deliberations. Gerard de 
Malynes  and Edward  Misselden, who  did  not  have  direct access to the  crown’s  decision centers, 
rushed to engage in a harsh pamphlet confrontation in an attempt to make their voices heard. Thomas 
Mun, on the other hand, who had managed to achieve a firm position within the public committees, 
left it for his son to publish his ideas long after he had already passed away. Lionel Cranfield, who 
could actually impose his own way, did not even bother. 
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